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 Multinational enterprises, development and globalisation: Some 
clarifications and a research agenda  
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Abstract 
This paper revisits an earlier contribution (Narula and Dunning 2000) and considers how 
economic globalisation has changed the nature of the MNE, MNE motivations, the MNE 
subsidiary and the modalities by which they interact with domestic economic actors. Most 
developing countries, however, have responded reactively. We discuss how the opportunities and 
challenges for developing countries in following an MNE-assisted development strategy have 
changed over the last decade. 
The growing share of industrial activity owned and controlled by MNEs does not always 
result in a proportional increase in development effects, because individual MNE establishments 
have different potential for externalities. Concatenation is important: when stage-inappropriate 
MNE activities are established, crowding-out or regulatory capture is a likely outcome. We 
highlight the need for systematically linking MNE and industrial policies, but differently than in 
the import-substitution era. Attracting the ‘rights kind’ of MNE activity remains important, but 
the greater heterogeneity requires more customisation of policy tools. Lastly, we warn of the 
dangers of underestimating the social and political costs of structural adjustment and rapid 
institutional change associated with globalization. 
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Multinational enterprises, development and globalisation: Some 
clarifications and a research agenda  
 
1. Introduction 
In an earlier article published in Oxford Development Studies (Narula and Dunning 2000) we 
examined the changing realities associated with globalisation, and how these changes affected 
the limitations and opportunities for developing countries in a global economy where MNEs 
played an increasingly important role as catalysts, participants and instigators in development. 
We felt that the relationship between host country governments and MNEs in this new economic 
milieu remained an uneasy one, and that, by and large, less developed countries were in a weaker 
position vis-à-vis MNEs when (and if) they sought to implement an FDI-assisted development 
strategy. We also emphasised that the kinds of FDI a country received was at least as important 
as the quantity of FDI, and that the motivation of FDI was of crucial significance. 
Over the last 10 years, globalisation has led to a rapid growth in MNE activity. MNEs 
have proactively sought to reorganise their activities, whether inter-firm or intra-firm; intra-
border or cross-border, exploiting the opportunities that globalisation has made available. Host 
governments in the developing countries, on the other hand, can be said to have responded to this 
‘new world’ in a more reactive fashion, if at all.   
As with our earlier contribution, our aim is not to summarise or highlight trends in 
current affairs, which form – now as then - a background to our discussion.  We use our earlier 
article as a lens with which to limit the span of our commentary; reviewing and addressing 
lacunae to our earlier arguments, and suggest a variety of avenues where further research will 
help advance the understanding of MNE-assisted development.  
Utilising the investment development path (IDP) as a framework, we will revisit our 
discussion of the ‘right kinds of FDI’, and the role of policy. We will consider how economic 
globalisation has changed the nature of the MNE, the MNE subsidiary and the modalities by 
which they interact with economic actors and affect development. Our intention is to return to 
the issue at the heart of the matter – that of development, and the opportunities and challenges 
less developed countries may face in following an MNE-assisted development strategy. We seek 
to advance the understanding of the interaction between MNEs and development, and push the 
6 
research agenda to focus on the points of inflection in the growth trajectory of countries, and the 
role MNEs can play in this. We examine how policy in developing countries has evolved, and 
highlight how institutional inertia has meant that MNE policies and industrial policies still reflect 
the import substitution era, and how this needs to evolve if MNE assisted development needs to 
be promoted. 
Section 2 revisits the theoretical basis for our discussion, and highlights how 
globalisation may have changed the nature of the IDP. Section 3 revisits the importance of policy 
in the IDP, a factor we neglected to cover in detail in our earlier paper. Section 4 discusses how 
MNE activity has become heterogeneous, while section 5 revisits the subject of motivation of 
MNE activity. Section 6 brings the discussion on the interactive aspects of MNE activity and 
development into focus. Section 7 discusses some conclusions and policy implications.  
2. Revisiting the Investment Development Path 
The framework for our discussion is the investment development path (IDP) (see Narula and 
Dunning 2000, Dunning and Narula 1996, Narula 1996). The basic principles of the IDP can be 
summarised as follows: 
• There is a systematic relationship between the structure, extent and nature of the FDI 
activities associated with a given location, and the economic structure of that location, 
which in turn, reflects its level of economic development; 
• There is an interactive effect between three groups of advantages: The O advantages of 
domestic firms, the O advantages of MNEs and the L advantages of countries. This three-
way dynamic interaction is the essence of MNE-assisted development; 
• This relationship can be usefully analysed by categorising their evolution through five 
stages, and that ceteris paribus this stage wise progression can be observed in all 
countries, although the rate of change and points of inflection are unique to every 
country.  
 
*** FIGURE 1 about HERE*** 
 
We will differentiate between two ‘versions’ of the IDP. These versions reflect to different 
modes of applicability, rather than a variation in its fundamental nature. The first ‘version’ is the 
graphical IDP (Figure 1). This was originally intended as an illustrative mechanism to emphasise 
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the systematic nature of the relationship between FDI and development, but has itself become the 
subject of empirical studies which utilise both time series of individual countries and cross-
sectional analyses. The latter was intended as a proxy for the former, for a given country2. These 
analyses presume that the IDP provides a theoretical basis for predicting the optimum or 
appropriate levels of FDI for a given level of GDP. Studies that compare countries ignore the 
idiosyncratic nature of individual countries. Their economic structure and industrial and 
technological specialisation reflect exogenously determined characteristics such as size, 
population, geographic location, natural resource endowments and so forth. Each country follows 
a unique and individual IDP, and the stages through which it passes through are also unique and 
specific to itself, and to its IDP. Cross-country comparisons are only to be undertaken advisedly, 
providing little in the way of development implications as the stages are indicative rather 
categorical.  
However, perhaps most importantly, to imply a predictive aspect to the IDP would be to 
presume a causal relationship between FDI and GDP, and as any student of econometrics will 
affirm, correlations do not imply causality. It is not entirely clear that there is a direct causality 
between FDI and development3. Indeed, we would go so far as saying that while a relationship 
exists between MNEs and development, this relationship ‘hides’ a very large ‘black box’ of 
intervening mechanisms and processes. Unless these intervening mechanisms between MNE 
activity and development are properly understood, all that can be said with certainty is that the 
determinants of FDI are also the determinants of development4 (Narula 1996).  
Indeed FDI is not essential for growth: Korea, Japan and (and to a lesser extent) Taiwan 
relied extensively on licensing, technology transfer agreements, imitation and other non-FDI 
                                                 
2
 Although these analyses serve to illustrate important issues, the use of cross-sectional analysis and specific proxies 
(such as net outward investment (NOI), and GDP) that are used to test the IDP raise several methodological and 
measurement challenges. This misunderstanding derives from the error of focusing on the empirical demonstration 
of the IDP, the now-well-known graphical representation of the relationship between MNEs and development, using 
NOI and GDP as proxies. Variables such as NOI represents an aggregation of inward and outward FDI, which are 
themselves also aggregate variable across a variety of sectors and industries, both of which seek to proxy the 
intensity of MNE activity. Furthermore, all values in such analyses – with almost no exception – have utilised 
nominal values of FDI and GDP, and in the case of FDI, variously utilising stocks, flows, sum-of-flows, and average 
flows as substitutes, a practice for which very little empirical evidence exists.  Much the same can be said about the 
dangers of GDP as a proxy for development.   
3
 See e.g., Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006), Hansen and Rand (2006) 
4
 One might even suggest that multinational activity is merely concatenated with host country growth, rather than 
being responsible for such growth. In other words, multinational activity may represent a placebo effect, indicative 
of improving domestic activity rather than being the most important cause of it.  However, it is not our intention to 
investigate this possibility. 
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based modalities to catch-up, the common element being the use of foreign knowledge sources 
(which may be tied to MNEs in general), rather than FDI.  Large amounts of FDI to resource-
rich economies have not always resulted in much more than marginal industrial development5, 
nor do high levels of FDI sustain industrial development equally efficiently in different stages.  
We propose later in this paper that it is more relevant to move to MNE activities as the unit of 
analysis.  
However, we want to make clear that we not postulating that FDI (or MNE) activity per 
se does not play a role in development. We are simply emphasizing that MNE (or FDI) activity is 
not a conditio sine qua non for development (Lall and Narula 2004). Instead the link between 
MNEs and development is an indirect one: Where inward MNE activity results in positive 
externalities, and when domestic firms have the capacity to usefully internalize these 
externalities, and if the non-firm sector supports domestic capacity building, there will be 
industrial development.  The alleged growth of outward MNE activity from developing countries 
also raises similar concerns: outward MNE activity does not necessarily imply reverse 
knowledge transfer between (or indeed systematic links with) the foreign operations and the 
home country, or indeed that these knowledge flows will have a non-negligible effect on the 
home country. 
The more normative aspects of our earlier contribution addressed the quality and extent 
of the externalities due to these activities, and we postulated that this depends on the motivation 
of MNE activity, which is itself dependent on the kinds of L advantages available to them.  Even 
where the ‘right kinds’ of MNE activity are located in the host country, the O advantages of 
domestic firms need to have the necessary absorptive capability to benefit from them. 
The second ‘version’ of the IDP provides a framework within which to analyse 
development and the MNE6: the interactive relationship between the O advantages of firms and 
the L advantages of countries and how each provides the potential to instigate changes in the 
other, whether seen at a country, industry or firm level. This approach is succinctly summarised 
in Table 1. It provides the background within which we can ask: what forces and interactions 
determine the turning points of a country’s investment development path?  Why do some 
countries demonstrate a positive cumulative causation between MNEs and development in 
                                                 
5
 Although there may be growth in GDP, such growth does not imply industrial development.   
6
 See e.g. Barry et al (2003), Liu et al (2005), Galan et al (2007). 
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certain industries, yet fail in this regard in others? The considerable empirical evidence on the 
role of MNE in fostering growth does not offer any firm guide on these mechanisms.  Some of 
these gaps in our understanding – for instance, the extent to which FDI spillovers are internalized 
by domestic firms – may well reflect methodological weaknesses, inter alia, to do with the use of 
the total factor productivity and the production function model, as well as the problems in 
measuring technology, knowledge and learning with some of the popular proxies used (Rasiah 
2008).  Others may derive from the difficulties of aggregating effects on the level of the firm and 
industry, since spillovers may accrue to actors external to formally organized firms and sectors. 
Furthermore, economies may also have peculiar inter-industry relationships and 
interdependencies, some of which may lie in the informal sector.  
 
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
The MNEs and development literature has matured to the point that there are some clear 
certainties. We know that fostering appropriate domestic capabilities in an appropriate sequence 
can create the conditions to benefit from knowledge flows within an economy, and between 
economies. Such knowledge flows can be engendered in MNE activity, or with arms-length 
actors or quasi-hierarchical mechanisms such as alliances. Growth in earlier stages depends upon 
the assimilation and adaptation of more mature knowledge assets in sectors where absorptive 
capacities have been concurrently developed, and that the technology gap not be too large. 
Establishing the conditions for adaptation and assimilation of these knowledge flows which may 
be embodied in human capital, equipment (or indeed organisations), requires systematic 
coordination through industrial policy. The level and nature of industrial policy intervention 
varies both by the stage of the IDP, as well as the kinds of MNE-related development strategies 
that the country may have focused on. The strength or weakness of institutions shape the ability 
of domestic firms to exploit MNE-generated externalities efficiently. Some take a systems 
perspective to an economy, which subsumes the institutions view - that the efficiency of 
economic actors depends on how much and how efficiently they interact amongst themselves. 
(Fagerberg and Srohlec 2007, Criscuolo and Narula 2008). Others have directed their attention to 
understanding the concept of absorptive capacity as a basis to explain the success or failure of 
MNE-assisted development.  
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Considerably less is known about the points of inflection. Much of the research points to 
important threshold levels (of absorptive capacities/human capital/infrastructure, etc) without 
which countries fail to ‘take off’. It is an essential aspect of the IDP, since it consists of an 
interaction between development and outward MNE activity, and between development and 
inward MNE activity, two separate but concatenated processes that themselves have 
associations. The IDP thus has many such points which need to be more clearly identified and 
their implications understood. It is unclear (for instance) what threshold level of L advantages is 
necessary to begin to attract the right kinds of FDI that promote growth in stage 1 countries. Or 
why Malaysia has thus far failed to progress towards being home to significant outward MNE 
activity, despite high growth rates, high levels of inward FDI activity and a vibrant domestic 
sector.  It is in the search to provide more detail of these processes, or at the very least, to 
provide greater richness to the framework to understand these turning points that forms part of 
the motivation behind the current paper.  
It is important to highlight that while much of the work on the IDP focuses on the country 
level, learning and absorption take place at the firm level. However, the success or failure of 
individual firms occurs in orchestration with an entire “system”. Innovation and learning involve 
complex interactions between a firm and its environment. The environment consists firstly of 
interactions between firms especially between a firm and its network of customers and suppliers. 
Secondly, the environment involves broader factors shaping the behaviour of firms: the social 
and perhaps cultural context; the institutional and organizational framework; infrastructures; the 
processes which create and distribute scientific knowledge, and so on. Thus, the appropriate level 
of analysis to understand the effects of MNEs on development may not necessarily be that of the 
country, but the industry. Aggregation to a national level can lead to obfuscation of important 
trends (see Duran and Ubeda 2001, Bellak 2001, who undertake an analysis of the IDP at the 
industry level). 
 
2.1 Supra-national regions, countries or regions within countries? 
The IDP is not just restricted to understanding MNEs and development and a country level, but 
also regions within countries: indeed, it may be more relevant at a disaggregated level7. Large 
                                                 
7
 See e.g., Zhang and Bulcke (1996) 
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differences exist in the developmental levels of regions within given countries, and this disparity 
is naturally reflected in the quality of L advantages on offer to MNEs. China provides an 
excellent illustration of this. The distribution of FDI inflows to its three macro-regions remains 
very uneven with the highest concentration on the coastal region, with the vast central (both in 
terms of land area and population) and western regions having only lured a small amount of 
FDI8. The coastal region has essentially been converging with the world economy, while the 
central region and western region have been diverging in relative terms9.  
Thus, despite close geographical proximity, sub-regions within a country can therefore 
exhibit vastly different L advantages.  It is therefore not inconceivable that a given nation state 
can exhibit industrial development patterns, MNE activities and policies reminiscent of inter alia 
both a stage 1 location and a stage 3 location simultaneously and evolve in parallel, but 
independently so. Situations such as this may explain why (as some commentators have 
suggested) countries are seen to ‘jump’ stages (Mathews 2006), and leapfrog, enjoying the 
advantages of being newcomers and latecomers, engaged in labour intensive, Smithian industries 
as well as Schumpeterian sectors. Many developing countries demonstrate a dual (or even 
multiple) economy, and inter alia, help explain why attention has been drawn to the cases of 
China and India where pockets of world-class competence in extremely advanced knowledge-
intensive sectors have grown rather rapidly, cheek-by-jowl with agrarian and labour intensive 
sectors, more typical of a developing country in stage 1 or 2. Globalisation has made markets for 
technologies more efficient (albeit those that are some distance away from the technological 
frontier). Thus where regions or countries possess the relevant absorptive capacities, sector-
specific industrial catch-up is potentially possible.  However, such strategies require considerable 
complementary investments and large amounts of capital and planning – and are by no means 
always successful. 
Another feature of globalisation has been the increasing interdependence between nation 
states and the fuzziness of borders. Nation states experience increasingly ‘fuzzy’ policy 
boundaries because policy space is limited by other non-national economic actors (whether other 
countries, or by international and supranational organisations). Obviously, there is considerable 
variation in the extent to which countries are so affected, and roughly speaking, the stage of the 
                                                 
8
 Among the all registered FDI by the end of 2004, the coastal region had 87.8%, the central region had 8.3% and 
the western region 3.9%. 
9
 On a GDP per capita basis, Shanghai was US$ 5280, 10 times greater than that of Guizhou Province in 2004.   
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IDP reflects the extent to which they are integrated into the world economy, and to which non-
national institutions, and knowledge sources affect them. To some extent, the extent to which 
countries are peripheral to the core is reflected in their stage of the IDP. Peripheral economies 
(such as stage 1 countries) are those which play an insignificant role as either host or home to 
MNEs; engage in relatively little trade in intermediate and manufactured goods; contribute 
relatively little to innovation and scientific progress; that are weakly linked or accessible 
physically to the core; do not play a significant role in decision making within supranational 
organizations; and do not share a significant number of formal institutions with the core 
countries  (Benito and Narula 2008). Globalization implies de facto economic, political and 
social integration, thereby creating a longer term interdependence between countries and firms 
that are so interconnected, but interdependence implies reciprocity. Countries for whom 
reciprocity is ‘unequal’ demonstrate fewer cross-border effects of globalisation on policy.   
Regional integration is an important accessorial development to globalisation, and has a 
similar effect on limiting policy space, as well as potentially improving its L advantages.  
Regional integration schemes also represent an opportunity to redress the inequities of 
multilateral agreements, and to increase their autonomy from outside forces. Both regional 
integration and globalisation are processes closely associated with cross-border economic 
activity, although globalisation is more a consequence of increased cross-border activity, while 
regional integration is intended to cause it (Dunning and Narula 2004).  
Regional integration can also play a significant role in changing the milieu for learning, 
MNE linkages, and general cross-border knowledge flows. The effect of regional integration can 
strengthen the L advantages of countries and can be crucial in determining the efficiency with 
which knowledge is acquired, created, diffused and utilised. In deeper integration schemes, rules 
established at the supranational level can supersede national regulatory frameworks, and 
membership itself becomes a significant L advantage. They can also act to constrain policy 
space: international treaties such as WTO agreements also shape policy tools available to 
countries.   
 
3. Revisiting policy orientation as a force in development 
It is necessary to distinguish between policy orientations in somewhat greater detail in 
understanding the IDP, particularly with regards to developing and upgrading domestic 
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competitiveness, and this needs to be done in a historical context. Previous policy orientations 
will have shaped the way in which economic activity is organised, and there is considerable 
consequent inertia and path dependence in economic structure, which often limits the efficacy of 
current policy. Despite an ostensibly greater openness to inward FDI, countries that had hitherto 
restricted inward FDI flows continue to show attenuated inward MNE activity, such as Japan, 
Korea, and India. Our earlier work distinguished amongst economies using a dichotomy of an 
outward-oriented, export-oriented policy orientation (OL-EO), or an inward-looking, import-
substituting orientation (IL-IS), which in hindsight seemed an oversimplification. Policy 
orientation plays a significant role in hindering or promoting MNE activity. This dichotomy also 
presumed no explicit strategy towards MNEs, but emphasised trade policies.  
We propose that there is both a considerably greater overlap in how policy has 
historically been implemented, reflecting the fact that most countries’ policies derived at some 
level from the more generic import-substitution model. At the same time, important variations in 
the political, sociological and economic milieu have affected MNE and development strategies, 
and continues to affect trajectories today.  
At the risk of oversimplifying a complex set of developments10, import substitution (IS) 
was intended to capture the rents that derived to the developed economies from value adding to 
the primary commodities imported from the south. The implementation of IS generally involved 
a high degree of central planning, combined with protection. Protection was undertaken through 
tariffs, exchange rate manipulation, quotas and exchange controls. Although one of the main 
objectives was to decrease manufactured imports, the net effect was also to discourage exports, 
in both manufacturing and agriculture, inter alia, because of overvalued exchange rates. 
Domestic industry was to be developed by seeking capital and technology from abroad, since it 
was largely accepted at the time that physical capital and know-how could be transferred 
relatively easily through the flow of aid, turn-key projects and the provision of technical experts 
from the north to the south.  
The role of MNEs was seen as a means to actualise the process of technology transfer. 
Investments in most countries were permitted in targeted sectors with the explicit understanding 
that control, ownership and technology would gradually transfer to the domestic sector. In 
                                                 
10
 See Bruton (1998) for a thorough overview. 
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addition, intermediate inputs were to be phased out as domestic suppliers acquired the 
competence to meet the (graduated and increasing) local content stipulations that were generally 
included in the investment agreements.  FDI was largely undertaken with the intention of 
supplying the local market.  Captive markets meant that MNEs were able to pass on the costs of 
producing at an inefficient scale. A considerable share of productive assets was in state 
ownership, either as a part of the belief in central planning, or to support large capital intensive 
and scale-intensive projects which the private sector could not afford.  
IS policies led to economic growth in most developing countries although the anticipated 
growth of domestic manufacturing did not go quite as planned. This in part reflected the 
application of broadly similar IS programmes, despite the considerable differences in the initial 
economic structure and industrial development. IS schemes sought to duplicate the same breadth 
of industrial sectors regardless of their initial specialisation and resource endowment.   
Although it is often assumed that the East Asian economies pursued a OL-EO approach, 
the majority of East Asian economies also implemented similar infant industry programs in the 
1950s, discouraging foreign ownership when possible, and encouraging the development of 
domestic enterprise in much the same way as had Latin American, African and South Asian 
countries.  While maintaining the basic objective of building up domestic manufacturing 
capacity, Taiwan modified its import substituting regime in the late 1950s, and Korea followed 
suit in the mid-1960s, seeking to encourage exports alongside the primary goal of building 
domestic industrial capacity. These included establishing a realistic exchange rate, and creating 
incentives to export (including subsidies, credit allocation, trade restrictions, and reduced or duty 
free access for imported inputs). Singapore went much further, dropping IS policies almost 
completely around the same time. Later, Malaysia, Thailand, began to move toward a greater 
export orientation and friendliness towards FDI from the late 1970s onwards, although still 
maintaining a strong orientation towards building domestic capacity. They were later followed 
by Indonesia, Philippines, China, India and eventually most of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
The point here is that all these countries pursued industrial policies that maintained significant 
elements of IS regimes until (and in some cases, beyond) the 1990s.  
Thus, while it is possible to say that the East Asian countries adopted a more outward-
looking, export-oriented policy orientation at a much earlier period in time. Almost all actively 
sought to intervene to support the growth and competitiveness of their domestic sector, alongside 
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their export-orientation11. This was done through a variety of means, both by promoting 
domestic sectors as well as restricting imports. East Asia can therefore be said to have been both 
export oriented and import-substituting (EO-IS) at the same time.   
Applying Lall’s (1992, 1996) taxonomy, three distinct approaches towards MNEs can be 
discerned. The first is the EO-IS Autonomous strategy, where selective restrictions on FDI, and 
the use of technology imports (in the case of Korea) was used as a means to promote domestic 
development. China’s approach in the 1980s and early 1990s also followed this model, and to 
some extent, that of Brazil a decade before that. The second is the OL-EO Strategic FDI 
dependent strategy.  This strategy is best exampled by Singapore, as well as new EU member 
states such as Czech Republic and Slovakia. The goal is not to focus explicitly on promoting a 
large domestic industrial base, but to attract and embed MNE activity, making strong efforts to 
upgrade the quality of FDI towards higher value-adding activities.  The third is the OL-EO 
Passive FDI dependent strategy.  In this model, FDI is also the primary driver, but instead to 
intervening to encourage upgrading (as with strategic FDI dependent strategy), it relies on 
market forces to encourage the upgrading process. Although policies to encourage the 
development of ‘generic’ location advantages may be implemented (such as infrastructure 
development, incentives for exports, skilled cheap labour), the development of complementary 
domestic industrial capacity are not developed in tandem with FDI upgrading.  
The large scale liberalisation of the economies of most developing countries since the 
mid 1980s saw a massive shift away from import substitution, but at different rates and with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. In many cases their prior orientations are still evident in their 
IDPs. For instance, Latin America did not voluntarily move towards an outward orientation, but 
was pressured into structural adjustment programmes due to economic crises in the 1980s. The 
restructuring entailed large-scale privatisation of public sector activities, rapid dismantling of 
import and FDI restrictions, and the termination or attenuation of state incentives and public 
goods aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of domestic firms.   
Thus, the IS programmes (as originally conceived) shared much in common with the 
autonomous strategy of Korea and Taiwan, except that in the Asian economies strong state 
intervention was more clearly targeted and coordinated to enhance domestic technological 
capabilities and competitiveness, while at the same time emphasising international markets as a 
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 For a discussion of these policies see Amsden (2001) and Lall (1996).   
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benchmark.  Subsequent restructuring strategies that have taken a largely passive FDI dependent 
policy went to the other extreme: they emphasised international markets and export 
competitiveness, but withdrew the support structure that allowed firms to internalise the positive 
externalities that derived from international competition. 
Inefficient institutions can retard the efficient accumulation and transfer of knowledge 
between industrial enterprises and other economic actors within their milieu, influencing growth 
in general (e.g., Rodrik, et. al. 2004; Lall and Narula 2004; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Asiedu 
2006). A fundamental shift from one political and/or economic regime or policy stance can 
represent a discontinuity or ‘shock’ to the system, and this can play havoc with both formal and 
informal institutions. There is often a strong institutional inertia which must be overcome, 
whether this shift is as fundamental as experienced by the former centrally planned economies 
during their transition, or from an import-substituting stance to a more open, export-oriented one, 
as experienced by many developing countries, the difference being only one of degree (Neuber 
1993, Narula and Jormanainen 2008).  
Inertia can be a pervasive phenomenon at the level of a whole economy, because often 
there is a self-reinforcing interaction between industrial enterprises, the infrastructure and 
politics which perpetuates the use of specific technologies, production of specific products, 
and/or through specific processes, and specific customer-supplier associations. Institutional 
restructuring is not an instantaneous or costless process and results in inefficient outcomes, since 
actors in the system are obliged to alter their raison d’etre. Institutions developed for, or 
specialised around, a particular economic system are not efficient in responding to the needs of 
another. In the case of the import-substituting countries, institutional inertia was often associated 
with selected industries built around national champions.  
The sudden exposure of these economies to the vagaries of international competition has 
not necessarily facilitated their institutional restructuring. Liberalisation in developing countries 
did not always take place gradually, requiring a multilateral view by governments on hitherto-
domestic issues.  Institutional inertia in most cases has meant that countries have been quick to 
see the costs of globalisation (principally the erosion of economic [and political] sovereignty and 
the sterility of policies and attitudes associated with import substitution) as outweighing the 
benefits associated with it. Although by the mid-2000s, many countries had largely overcome 
institutional inertia, it continues to shape the ‘flavour’ of policies. National champions and 
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interest groups dominant in the IS era continue to hold sway; a suspicion of MNEs continues to 
limit access in certain sectors.  
The policy orientation matters because without a clear industrial policy that is 
systematically integrated with FDI strategies will result in sub-optimal sustainable industrial 
growth opportunities. The current OL-EO passive FDI dependent strategy differs from the 
strategic FDI dependent strategy (as well as the IL-EO autonomous strategy) in several important 
respects, but especially because it underestimates the costs and the difficulties of internalising 
technological spillovers. Perhaps most significantly, however, is the failure to implement 
reciprocal control mechanisms and international competition to target competitiveness against 
international norms, which export-orientation allowed the East Asian economies to do. Countries 
such as Brazil that targeted international markets in certain industries, achieved similar levels of 
technological competitiveness to the Asian countries in certain areas (Amsden 2001). While the 
‘new’ OL-EO model has helped correct many inefficiencies, inter alia, improving important 
macro-economic fundamentals, and reduced the excessive role of the state in domestic industrial 
activity, it has also led to a rapid and overzealous reduction in the state’s involvement in the 
provision of public and quasi public goods which are necessary conditions for industrial 
development (Katz 2001). 
 
4. Heterogeneity in MNE activity 
4.1 Moving away from FDI and towards MNEs  
Although there is a tendency to associate the control and coordination of an MNE’s international 
operations with majority owned foreign affiliates (which is undertaken through FDI), both 
control and coordination may be achieved through a minority ownership, and in some cases 
through non-equity means.  Historically, FDI and MNE activity have been synonymous, partly a 
reflection of the way in which most international and national agencies that maintain and collect 
data on MNE activity. Although FDI remains one of the main modes by which MNEs engage in 
cross-border value adding activities, the MNE may also control and engage in value adding 
activities through non-equity means, such as through cooperative agreements and outsourcing, 
sometimes without de jure ownership of the productive assets, but de facto controlling the 
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operations of the non-affiliated operation. Therefore, the use of the term ‘MNE’ as a synonym 
for FDI is increasingly inaccurate (Wilkins 2001). 
The nature, structure and organization of the MNE has changed markedly over the last 40 
years, and especially so over the last decade. A more current definition of an MNE is a firm 
requires the emphasis on the nature of the interdependencies between the various operations in 
different locations, their active coordination and control across borders, and away from the 
ownership structure.  As we shall discuss in later sections, this has significant implications for 
development.  
We have noted elsewhere the importance of alliance capitalism, which implies that the 
favoured modes of cross-border value adding activity have begun to shift away from an emphasis 
on hierarchies towards a richer variety of organizational modes (Dunning and Lundan 2008). 
This has occurred along with a systematic shift in certain sectors and a variety of industries away 
from the vertically integrated firm. The improved enforceability of contracts and declining 
transaction and monitoring costs resulting from developments associated with globalisation have 
made it easier for firms of all sizes to monitor, identify and establish collaborative ventures than 
previously had been the case (Narula 2003). In other words, hierarchical control and full 
internalisation is no longer always a first-best option to MNEs. Even where this is so, full 
internalisation may simply not be a choice available to the MNE (Dunning and Narula 2004).  
This has implications for our understanding of the potential for non-internalised means of MNE 
activity to affect industrial development, a matter we shall be taking up in greater detail in a later 
section of this paper.  
The benefits that might accrue are primarily associated with the linkages between the 
MNE affiliate and domestic actors that provide knowledge spillovers. These may be domestic 
linkages (with knowledge flows between the affiliate and other actors in the domestic economy, 
depending upon the extent to which the affiliate is embedded), or they may be linkages between 
foreign sources of knowledge and affiliate. Although the FDI literature also addresses channels 
for knowledge spillovers, when the discussion to the level of the MNE, a richer variety of 
channels presents itself, although not all of which may benefit the host milieu.  
 
****FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
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Figure 2 illustrates a two-country scenario of a joint venture between an MNE and a 
domestic firm. With FDI as the unit of analysis, only the organisations linked with the block 
arrows matter, as these involve equity relationships. However, with the MNE as the unit of 
analysis, a variety of other means to engage in knowledge exchange can be included. For 
instance, technology may be licensed or purchased by the MNE affiliate from unaffiliated public 
research organisations either abroad or based locally. A second set of linkages are active two-
way collaborations (indicated in figure 2 by the dashed lines which may involve a large array of 
actors, both domestic and foreign. Such agreements represent a higher level of knowledge 
exchange, and may be undertaken with a variety of partners. In general, these non-equity 
linkages present considerable potential to increase knowledge flows and the potential 
technological competitiveness of domestic firms, as it creates important new sources of demand 
for commercially driven economic units engaged in R&D.  Of course, as we discuss later, MNEs 
are reluctant to develop knowledge-intensive linkages with new and untested partners, but they 
point to the potential for important knowledge flows, assuming the local milieu possesses the 
appropriate quality of location-specific advantages in terms of infrastructure, human capital and 
public-sector actors. 
It is worth mentioning that knowledge flows and linkages can also be associated with 
second and even third level suppliers to an MNE, as well as helping these firms with establishing 
partnerships with other non-related economic actors. Yeung et al (2006) point to important 
network effects for firms not directly related to the lead MNE in a cluster, and its role in creating 
non-cluster external economies for its suppliers. 
4.2 Refocusing analysis on the role of subsidiaries 
It has largely been assumed that the nature of the MNE affiliate and its potential for spillovers 
and the creation of domestic linkages is somehow reflected in the nature of the parent firm’s 
operation as a whole, both in terms of its industry-specific characteristics, as well as the kinds of 
ownership advantages it possesses and the nature of location advantages it seeks to utilise in 
conjunction with these O advantages.  
Different kinds of subsidiaries will provide different kinds of potential linkage and 
spillover effects (Cantwell and Mudambi 2000, Marin and Bell 2006, Jindra et al 2009). There 
are at least two reasons for this. First, because the O advantages of a subsidiary are not 
necessarily a subset of its parent (Birkinshaw 1996). In addition to the transfer of assets from the 
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parent to the subsidiary, the subsidiary also evolves its own set of managerial and technological 
capabilities which may either be as a response to location specific characteristics (such as 
peculiarities in supply conditions, or location specific demand), or because the subsidiary has 
evolved independently of the parent firm (either because the subsidiary is an acquisition, or 
because the MNE’s strategy is based on a ‘federal’ model of freestanding and largely 
autonomous country affiliates, as may also be expected with a firm that engages in a multi-
domestic strategy). As a result, such multinationals tend to be organised as a loosely coupled 
network of relatively autonomous subsidiaries, each with its own strategic goals and activities 
(Astley and Zajac 1990, Birkinshaw 2002). Even where the MNE operates as a tightly coupled 
organization with a high degree of interdependence and coordination between subsidiaries 
(Astley and Zajac 1991), the affiliate in question may possess affiliate-specific O advantages. 
Each affiliate can evolve its own profile of capabilities, which may overlap with that of the 
headquarters, but the extent of the overlap is a function of country- and subsidiary- specific path 
dependency (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998). In other words, the subsidiary itself may provide 
unique, subsidiary-specific spillovers to the domestic economy, and for this reason its strategic 
decisions in terms of sourcing and linkages may differ from that of a sister subsidiary in another 
host location, not just that of its headquarters.  
Second, the decision to interface with the local economy is not entirely a subsidiary level 
decision, particularly with more tightly coupled organisations. Thus, there are dangers of taking a 
purely subsidiary-level view when drawing policy decisions, without taking into account the 
manner in which the subsidiary’s strategy interfaces with that of the overall parent MNE strategy 
(Papanastassiou and Pearce 2009). The extent to which strategic decision making resides with 
the subsidiary relative to the headquarters is an important one. There are competing forces that 
require national responsiveness of subsidiaries and those that require subsidiaries’ global 
integration with the umbrella of the MNE’s overall structure. When national responsiveness of a 
subsidiary is important because local market or industry-specific conditions require greater 
response to individual host country circumstances, they exert more decision-making autonomy 
within the overall MNE setup. When there are considerable gains in terms of cross-border 
coordination, and industry-specific characteristics allow for greater standardisation, subsidiaries 
are afforded limited autonomy.  
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The two forces here – the extent to which subsidiaries possess unique and potentially 
valuable subsidiary-specific ownership advantages, and the extent to which the subsidiary is 
autonomous in its decision making - are of course closely linked. The subsidiary’s bargaining 
power vis-à-vis the HQ are greatly enhanced where a given subsidiary is a net contributor 
towards the MNEs overall knowledge capabilities, and is therefore able to exert not just greater 
autonomy on its own activities in its host location12, but also upon the entire MNE.   
One might argue that the ‘ideal’ situation would be to host subsidiaries that are both 
deeply integrated within the MNE network (and thus of signal importance to the MNE as a 
whole) as well as deeply integrated into the host milieu (which implies considerable linkages 
with the host economy) (Young and Tavares 2004, Costa and Fillipov 2008).  
Few developing countries are in such a position. They are often host to the most truncated 
affiliates possible with very little value-adding, and besides their governments do not have the 
bargaining power vis-à-vis MNEs to demand such concessions13. There are exceptional 
circumstances where this may be the case. For instance, in the case of affiliates acquired to 
internalize specific proprietary assets, and whose O advantages were location-bound to some 
extent (and therefore hard to duplicate or relocate elsewhere). Also, where affiliates have a long 
history in a given location and are therefore highly embedded. The cost of realigning its supplier 
base may greatly outweigh the benefits of integrating it more closely to the rest of the MNE. 
There are also subsidiaries in sectors where natural barriers to trade require a multi-domestic 
strategy. In other cases, tariff and non-tariff barriers in the past may have induced such a stance. 
Lastly, and in relatively few instances, there may be government intervention, where 
embeddedness has been a condition for their establishment (as in the case of e.g., China). 
It is important to note that while the literature on FDI and development focuses largely on 
spillovers and linkages there are a number of other possible benefits that may be derive from 
MNE activity. However, in terms of learning potential, these are the most significant. Therefore, 
attracting MNEs without considering the potential for linkage creation is short-sighted. MNEs 
seek well-established existing location advantages, and the initial scale of entry will tend to be 
small both in size, the scope and competence levels tend to match the existing capacity of the 
                                                 
12Although some research indicates that subsidiaries with greater than average competence levels are able to exert 
higher levels of autonomy (Pearce, 1999; Taggart & Hood, 1999); others have argued that because of the strategic 
importance of such a subsidiary, the HQ will attempt to exert tighter control (Martınez & Jarillo 1991). 
13
 Indeed, Iguchi (2008) notes that even in country such as Malaysia, linkages are rarely established because of 
government programmes. 
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innovation system, and the existing potential for backward linkages. This, in the case of most 
developing countries (and particularly in stage 1 countries) is often modest. The bulk of their 
higher value adding operations tend to be based in countries with the appropriate non-generic 
specialised L advantages– usually a handful of advanced Stage 4 and 5 countries, and an even 
smaller group of stage 3 economies. Attracting more strategic R&D activities to developing 
economies is especially difficult. MNEs tend to display a strong inertia towards maintaining their 
R&D activities in a few (carefully selected) locations (Narula 2002). Of course, operations of 
less strategic significance within the MNE may not be subject to such high levels of inertia, but it 
is safe to say that the greater the strategic importance of the activities planned in a given location, 
the greater the cost to the MNE of a ‘wrong’ decision, both from an economic and strategic 
perspective, and thus the greater the forethought in such investments, and the greater the 
locational inertia and bias towards proven and existing locations.  
Locational inertia works both ways: Just as it is difficult to persuade MNEs to establish 
operations in a de novo location, once a threshold level of activity and embeddedness is 
achieved, the MNE is less likely to be footloose, and its presence in a given location acts as an 
important signal to other potential entrants. For instance, Intel’s entry in Cost Rica acted as a 
signal to other firms, and not just to those firms within the same sector (Mytelka and Barclay 
2006).  
It is also worth noting that there is considerable path dependence in the type of subsidiary 
based in a given location. Prior to economic liberalization, MNEs responded to investment 
opportunities primarily by establishing miniature replicas of their facilities at home, although the 
extent to which they are truncated varied considerably between countries (Dunning and Narula 
2004). Few MNEs still utilise miniature replicas when engaging in greenfield investments. 
Rationalisation of activities with an efficiency-seeking objective has, in many cases, led to a 
downgrading of activities from truncated replica to single activity affiliates.  MNEs have taken 
advantage of liberalisation to rationalize production capacity in fewer locations to exploit 
economies of scale at the plant level, especially where local consumption patterns are not 
radically different to justify local capacity and where transportation costs are not prohibitive. 
This has meant that some miniature replicas have been downgraded to sales and marketing 
affiliates, which can be expected to have fewer opportunities for spillovers.  MNE activities has 
seen a downgrading in terms of both scope and competence, moving towards sales and 
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marketing operations, although some – rather few – locations (and once again, countries such as 
countries in or at the cusp of stage 3 such as India, China, and South Africa) have seen an 
increase in the scope or competence levels.  As MNEs have used complex networks, this has by 
and large been to the benefit of the MNE, while most host countries with generic location 
advantages have seen a decline in scale, scope and competence. The benefit from subsidiaries in 
terms of linkages and spillovers varies considerably and is not always reflective in its sales, 
employment or flows of FDI. A sales office or an assembly unit may have a high turnover, 
employ a large staff, but the technological spillovers will be relatively fewer than, a 
manufacturing facility. Countries that are at an early stage of the IDP, with a very limited 
domestic sector and a poorly defined innovation system are often host to single-activity 
subsidiaries, primarily in sales and marketing, as well as natural resource extraction. The most 
advanced economies with domestic technological capacity have hosted the least truncated 
subsidiaries, often with R&D departments.   
It is only in those sectors where ‘specialized’ location advantages associated with higher 
value adding exist can host countries benefit significantly from MNE activity in the long run. 
This requires a considerable amount of government interaction and investment into tangible and 
intangible infrastructure, and for which there is a certain threshold level of investment in 
building up absorptive capacities required for ‘take-off’. As countries reach a threshold level of 
technological capabilities, governments need to provide more active support through macro-
organizational policies. This implies developing and fostering specific industries and 
technological trajectories, such that the location advantages they offer are less ‘generic’ and 
more specific, highly immobile and such that they encourage mobile investments to be locked 
into these assets. 
In general, government incentives and subsidies have proven to be rarely pivotal in 
determining the scope and competence of MNEs (which normally imply greater potential for 
greater technological spillovers). We want to emphasise that even if FDI were attracted through 
large subsidies it is unlikely to become embedded, or provide significant externalities and 
spillovers to the host economy without the appropriate domestic absorptive capacity (Criscuolo 
and Narula 2008). From a growth and learning perspective, externalities only matter if they can 
be captured by other economic actors in the host economy. For externalities to be optimally 
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utilised there needs to be an appropriate match between the nature of potential externalities and 
the absorptive capacities of domestic firms. 
It is worth noting that the discussion on MNE-assisted development continues to focus 
excessively on the attraction of new (initial) MNE affiliate establishments and its associated 
mode of entry. From a development perspective, this ignores the fact that any given affiliate is 
itself in the process of its own internal dynamics (as discussed earlier). The nature of its activities 
also relies on a dynamic between the MNE’s value adding operations and the changing L 
advantages of the host location over time.  
There is a considerable literature on the individual MNE’s choice of mode of entry (see 
Meyer et al 2009). We know that MNEs may be more likely to transfer sophisticated 
technologies and management techniques to their wholly owned subsidiaries than to partially 
owned affiliates (Javorcik and Saggi 2004). Nonetheless, the extent of the spillovers and linkages 
are not always determined ex ante. It is largely accepted that the benefits of MNE activities 
accrue most often where the affiliate is embedded in the local milieu, and ceteris paribus, initial 
greenfield investments – no matter how large the initial investment might have been – does not 
become immediately deeply embedded into the host economy, but becomes develops linkages 
slowly, and over time14.  Increased embeddedness implies increased linkages, and thus sequential 
investments strongly suggest greater potential for development. The initial investment represents 
a tentative ‘bet’ by the MNE on the quality of a host’s L advantages. The nature of inertia is such 
that it is easier to persuade those that already have sunk costs in facilities to expand them 
(assuming positive returns15 to the MNE and constant or improving L advantages), than to seek 
to attract a new Greenfield investment. Thus, investments that take place several years after the 
initial investment may be more beneficial in terms of spillovers and linkages (Filippov and Costa 
2008).  
5. Revisiting the motivation of MNE activity 
Table 2 lists how motives of FDI have evolved between the 1970s and the early 2000s.  Cross-
border organization structures were simple, and motivations for specific subsidiaries tended to be 
overwhelmingly resource seeking or market-seeking, with a minority of MNEs engaged in 
                                                 
14
 This bias is reflected in the inordinate attention given to FDI flows, rather than FDI stocks by the financial press 
as well as policymakers, the underlying assumption perhaps being that capital formation is about capital per se. 
15 Iguchi (2008) finds that subsidiaries’ are more likely to create backward linkages with the host economy when the 
affiliate is seen to yield positive returns. 
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efficiency-seeking or strategic asset-seeking activities. The emphasis has shifted considerably 
over the last 30 years, in that MNEs have become increasingly sophisticated in managing and 
integrating activities across borders, and even relatively new and smaller MNEs are organized to 
maximize cross-border efficiencies and take advantages of the economies that derive from 
multinationality. MNE operations increasingly tend to involve multiple motivations 
simultaneously (Criscuolo et al 2005). One can, nonetheless, speak of certain host locations 
providing L advantages that are especially suited for specific activities, relative to other 
activities. One would not expect significant strategic asset-seeking activities in stage 1 countries, 
where L advantages would be ideally suited to resource-seeking activities. At the same time, a 
single country might be host to several subsidiaries of the same MNE, each motivated 
differently, or in different parts of the same country. Given our earlier discussion about sub-
national regions and differences within countries, it should come as no surprise that such 
multiple L advantages attract MNE activity simultaneously motivated by such vastly different 
intentions. 
 
***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Given the multiple motivations any given MNE establishment might engage in a given 
location, understanding the potential for industrial development by focusing largely on attracting 
MNE activity with specific motives is increasingly difficult. Nonetheless, the discussion on the 
motives remains important, because motivations are indicative of the potential consequences of 
their activities, and changing motivations over time reflect on how L advantages are perceived to 
have evolved by MNEs.  However, by themselves, motives cover a multitude of sins, not least 
because there is considerable overlap between the motives. In addition, MNE motives and 
strategies are interrelated. Domestic market oriented affiliates generally purchase more locally 
than export-oriented firms because of lower quality requirements and technical specifications. 
MNEs create more linkages when they use intermediate goods intensively, communication costs 
between parent and affiliate are high, and the home and host markets are relatively similar in 
terms of intermediate goods. Affiliates established by M&As are likely to have stronger links 
with domestic suppliers than those established by greenfield investment, since the former may 
find established linkages that are likely to retain if they are efficient. Linkages vary significantly 
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by industry. In the primary sector, the scope for vertical linkages is often limited, due to the use 
of continuous production processes and the capital intensity of operations. Investments in the 
primary sector continue to provide limited avenues for upgrading unless carefully shepherded.  
In manufacturing the potential for vertical linkages are broader, depending on the extent of 
intermediate inputs to total production and the type of production processes. 
From an outward FDI perspective, it is worth noting that UNCTAD 2005 reports that 
even relatively new MNEs from developing countries are increasingly engaging in strategic 
asset-seeking investments. However, it is not entirely clear whether such firms are able to 
internalise and efficiently utilise such knowledge acquired to generate sustainable O advantages 
that can be exploited elsewhere, particularly where they do not possess the necessary 
complementary assets to do so. It is worth noting that a distinction needs to be drawn between 
‘strategic investments’ and ‘strategic asset-seeking investments’. Firms may make strategic 
investments that may provide no discernible economic contribution to the MNE, but which may 
affect their long-term market positioning, for instance, through M&A. Asset-seeking activities 
imply the active augmentation of existing ownership advantages through, inter alia, R&D, 
although the literature has tended to blur the difference between the two. 
Different motivations of outward FDI by developing country MNEs, likewise, require 
different O advantages of MNEs, and seek specific types of L advantages. Not all types of 
outward MNE activity necessarily imply significant learning opportunities for the home-based 
operations of the MNE. In the case of natural resource-seeking investments for instance, but they 
rarely represent channels for reverse technology transfer.  It is worth noting that there is not 
inconsiderable FDI in sectors where firms by necessity require a foreign presence, particularly in 
service based industries. Some of these investments are ‘strategic’ – banks and insurance 
companies need to maintain overseas operations in strategic financial centers such as New York 
and London. Yet others require a physical presence since the nature of their activity requires 
proximity to clients. Such investments are both market-seeking and resource-seeking and while 
knowledge acquired from such operations helps improve best practice, the extent to which they 
benefit home-country operations depends upon the extent to which the MNE itself seeks to 
evolve into a global integrated enterprise, or maintain its foreign operations as de facto free-
standing enterprises with weak links to the parent company. Lastly, outward FDI may also be a 
27 
means to exit institutional constraints at home (Witt and Lewin 2007), or may be seeking to 
benefit from regulatory arbitrage.   
 
6. Rapid internationalisation and inward MNE activity: will development 
also increase pace?  
 
Most indicators suggest that the level and intensity in the activities of MNEs – in terms of share 
inward FDI in the overall economic activity of individual economies - has increased generally 
and across the board in most developing countries. However, we are not convinced that increased 
inward MNE activity necessarily implies that this will result in more rapid industrial 
development. In principle, a potential positive outcome from the greater participation of MNEs 
in a developing economy would be a crowding-in effect, with MNE activity stimulating new and 
more efficient domestic economic activity that might not have occurred had not the MNE 
invested in that location. On the other hand, the contrary result – that of crowding-out – where 
domestic firms are displaced, out-competed or pre-empted by foreign-owned MNEs – is an 
outcome that countries seek to avoid.  
Based on data for the period 1971-2000, for Latin America, Asia and Africa, Agosin and 
Machado (2005) found that at best the effect of FDI on domestic investment is a neutral one, 
with crowding-out having taken place in Latin America in the 1970s, and in Africa during the 
1990s. Despite the limitations of aggregate data, these results lend support to studies on 
spillovers and raise the spectre – once again – of the importance of appropriateness and quality 
of FDI, rather than the prevalent focus on quantity. It draws emphasis to the need to match FDI 
with domestic capacity building and the importance of FDI embedding, and the need to 
understand FDI not as a discrete single-period FDI flow, but as a multi-period building up of FDI 
stock through deepening and spreading of value adding activities, not all of which occur as a 
consequence of new flows of foreign capital.  
Crowding-in is a phenomenon that relies extensively on several separate but inter-linked 
actions. Crowding-in occurs through the competition effect through strengthening the existing 
ownership advantages of domestic firms, promoting horizontal growth of competing domestic 
firms’ local operations. A positive competition effect implies that the presence of MNE 
subsidiaries that have a higher productivity in a given industry spurs domestic competitors to 
28 
raise their productivity by improving the efficiency of their operations in order to compete 
effectively. When crowding-in happens through a positive competition effect, existing domestic 
competitors (and possible new domestic entrants) in the same industry demonstrate increased 
capacity (itself a result of increased efficiency) and market share16.  
Efficiency gains also happen through a variety of other means, and indeed it is difficult in 
practise to separate these different modalities by which MNE subsidiaries may affect domestic 
industry. For instance, efficiency gains in non-related industries where similar techniques may be 
applied is known as the demonstration effect.  In addition there are numerous spillover effects 
that relate to the competition effect. For instance, through its more efficient organisation of its 
linkages with input suppliers, as well as with customers; which themselves also leads to indirect 
efficiency gains to competitors who reap the advantage of a more efficient set of suppliers.  In 
addition, there are benefits that derive from indirect spillovers through employment effects, 
where domestic firms benefits from training provided by the MNE subsidiary to its employees, 
and who subsequently become available to domestic firms through the job market (and who may 
in subsequent periods establish new competitors themselves, thus a third degree effect).  
Barrios et al (2006) found that in Ireland initially a negative competition effect prevailed, 
leading to the exit of domestic competitors, perhaps partly because of the inability of the more 
inefficient firms to respond as rapidly to the FDI. However, they also found that over time the 
negative relationship reverses itself, due to other positive externalities deriving from linkages 
and spillovers. This result is a significant one, since it implies that crowding-out is followed by 
crowding in, implying domestic firms eventually overcome structural inertia. However, a study 
by Wang and Yu (2007) using data for China reveals that increases in levels of FDI participation 
do not always follow a linear relationship with the extent of spillovers that derive there from, 
varying instead by industry. In technology-intensive sectors, net positive spillovers increased 
with foreign participation, but in labour intensive sectors, once foreign capital accounted for 
more than approximately two-thirds of an industry, there was evidence that net positive 
spillovers declined, and crowding-out was observed.  These various results seem to point to the 
fact that there is probably an optimal size of foreign presence to promote domestic industrial 
                                                 
16
 It may also occur in non-related industries where similar techniques for efficiency gains may be applied through 
what is known as the demonstration effect.  In addition there are numerous spillover effects which we will discuss in 
another section. Indeed it is difficult in practise to separate these different means by which MNE subsidiaries may 
affect domestic industry. 
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development through net positive externalities therefrom, and this varies considerably upon the 
industry of activity, as well as the aspect of the value chain in which the MNE subsidiaries and 
the domestic firms are engaged in. 
Other complementary arguments have been proposed by (see e.g., Aitken and Harrison 
1999, Mody 2004) which point to the possibility that MNEs enjoy at least two advantages over 
their domestic counterparts which do not necessarily promote positive effects because they are 
not easily transferable. First, MNEs may have a low marginal cost to utilize the O advantages of 
their parent (whether in the form of advertising, brand names, technological assets, or knowledge 
of networks). Such advantages of multinationality and size are simply not available to smaller 
firms. Second, they may be much more aggressive and flexible in utilising these advantages, not 
being encumbered with the inertia that derives from being integrated into the local system, and 
the associated path dependent political and social obligations (Wang and Yu 2007).  These 
results also point to the size of the technology gap between the MNEs and their domestic 
counterparts. Where the gap is too large, crowding-out effects are likely to predominate. It is 
worth noting that the decline in domestically owned production in a liberalised milieu does not 
always reflect a crowding out in the traditional sense that the domestic firm ‘exits’ by virtue of 
being economically unviable. Narula and Marin (2005) note for the case of Argentina, 
liberalisation has permitted a number of the more successful domestic firms to be acquired by 
MNEs.  
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
There has undoubtedly been a systemic change in the world economy with globalisation. MNEs, 
in particular, are cognizant of the opportunities for cost-economising, market-share expansion 
and learning that this implies, as well as the risks associated with greater competition. By and 
large, they have proactively responded to the changing circumstances and have reorganised 
themselves accordingly.  
MNEs are using a richer variety of organisational modes, and while FDI remains the 
single most important modality by which they engage with developing countries, it is worth 
emphasising that there are a variety of other means by which MNEs may engage with, or 
influence domestic economic activity. Non-FDI means of engaging with host economies are 
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likely to grow in importance. We have also underlined that there is also a need to acknowledge 
the greater heterogeneity in the kinds of MNEs, their subsidiaries, and the potential development 
effects they might have.  
Developing countries, on the other hand, have largely reacted to the circumstances by 
liberalising their policies towards FDI, but this is not the same as developing FDI policies. Most 
take a passive approach to attracting FDI flows, and pay insufficient attention to the nature of the 
benefits and costs associated with embedding subsidiaries and exploiting externalities. The 
adoption of neoliberal policies as part of structural adjustment programmes in many developing 
countries has meant that few have an explicit or well-considered industrial policy, often applying 
principles that belong as part of a more closed, import-substituting era. This is increasingly at 
odds with the economic realities of a post-WTO, interdependent world where such policies have 
limited purchase. But industrial policy still remains an essential tool to promote development, 
despite globalisation. As Haque (2007) puts it, ‘[libersalisation has]…changed the context but 
not the importance of policy in industrial development’. Specifically, policies towards MNEs 
need to be closely linked and integrated with industrial policy. MNE activity needs to be 
evaluated by considering the kinds of externalities that are generated; whether and how domestic 
actors can internalise them; and what kinds of L advantages may be required to achieve this. 
Indeed, the ‘success stories’ of MNE-assisted development have sought to attract MNEs, but 
have also built up domestic absorptive capacities in tandem.  They have then tried to upgrade 
their L advantages to encourage MNEs to both deepen and broaden their local value adding 
activities. (e.g., Wade 1990, Kaplinsky 2000, Lorentzen 2005, Morris and Barnes 2008, 
Henderson et al 2002, Giuliani et al 2005, Rasiah 2006, Giroud 2003). The opportunities to 
upgrade value chains and linking them with non-domestic actors are still there , although the 
tools available to do so may have changed. Traditional infant industry policies that date back to 
List (1844) and others are inapplicable to open economies. Given the heterogeneity of MNE 
activity, it makes sense that policies are fine-tuned to specific industries in particular countries 
rather than a general, one-size-fits-all approach that was utilised during the import-substitution 
era. Nonetheless, it is also clear that completely unfettered access to domestic markets by MNEs 
can have a detrimental effect on sustainable domestic growth (Chang 2004).  
The IDP as a framework has been useful in making the point that an increase in FDI (or 
MNE activity) does not result in a concomitant increase in development. There is no reason to 
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believe that countries will move any quicker through the stages of the IDP simply because MNE 
activity has increased.  Quite apart from the dangers of crowding-out and the problems of stage-
inappropriate MNE activities, it is not clear that increased MNE activity necessarily implies a 
proportional increase in spillovers and linkages. An important issue not dealt with in this paper 
(or elsewhere) is the potential development effects of MNE activity in the services sector. This 
has been an area of growth in terms of inward FDI. However, there is considerable variety in the 
nature of services – investments in telecommunications provides relatively few knowledge 
spillovers and linkages to domestic firms in the least developed countries, compared to banking. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies that evaluate relative benefits of investments in tertiary 
sectors, relative to primary or secondary sectors. Another ‘new’ issue that needs further 
exploration is outward MNE activity from developing countries. It is not necessarily clear how 
outward MNE activity benefits home countries, and how this varies by sector, motivation or part 
of the value chain.  
The discussion of MNEs and development has not as yet addressed the matter of points 
of inflection within the IDP, and in development in general. What are the threshold levels of 
MNE activity to promote growth, perhaps focusing on the industrialisation ‘failures’ which are 
sometimes located in the same geographical space as ‘successes’? Why has India been unable to 
move away from light manufacturing towards more innovation-intensive manufacturing, unlike 
China, or Brazil? Liang (2004) for instance, explores the relative success of the mobile 
telecommunications sector with the automobile sector in China and finds that although similar 
industrial policy was applied to the two sectors, very different outcomes have resulted.  
We underline that MNE activity is not only about spillovers and linkages. Few individual 
MNE establishments can be all things – some may simply provide low-level employment, or 
primarily represent tax revenue streams. In other words, there is a need to match and understand 
what the potential benefits of specific MNE projects are, to specific outcomes from the host 
country perspective.   
In discussing MNE-assisted development, economists pay too little attention to the 
political and sociological aspects. The politics of reform and the social and political costs of 
structural adjustment and institutional change are seldom taken into account. The extent to which 
external (non-national) organizations and countries determine national outcomes can also affect 
the efficiency with which de facto reforms have taken place. Henisz et al (2005) for instance, 
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find that there is considerable variation in the efficacy of market-oriented reforms across 
countries, and that coercion by international agencies may lead to a less than ideal outcome. 
Interest groups within a society can also impede or promote a specific agenda (e.g., Spiller 1990, 
Potters and Sloof 1996), but this has remained largely unexplored in development studies. 
Interests groups can engage in regulatory capture, and help shape public policy to suit their own 
particular commercial or political interests.  
Understanding development and MNE activity require a cross-disciplinary approach, and 
understanding development in a post-Washington consensus world requires us to advance the 
analyses beyond aggregate economic growth. It is also about income disparities and what 
Amartya Sen defines as human development. Likewise, understanding the possibilities for MNE-
assisted development requires us to move towards understanding the globalisation world as it is, 
unconstrained by academic disciplines. It requires us to move away from the two standard 
dimensions – MNEs and markets – and systematically take into account not just the dimension of 
international organisations and institutions, but also the role of civil society.  
 
33 
References  
Agosin, M. & Machado, R. (2005) Foreign investment in developing countries: Does it crowd in domestic 
investment? Oxford Development Studies, 33(2), pp. 149-162. 
Aitken, B. & Harrison, A. (1999) Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment? Evidence from 
Venezuela, American Economic Review, 89(9), pp. 605-618. 
Amsden, A. (2001) The Rise of the ‘The Rest’, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Asiedu, E. (2006). Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, market size, government 
policy, institutions and political instability, World Economy, 29(1), pp. 63-77. 
Astley, W. and Zajac, E. (1990) Beyond dyadic exchange: functional interdependence and sub-unit power, 
Organization Studies, 11, pp. 481-501. 
Astley, W. & Zajac, E. (1991) Intraorganizational power and organizational design: reconcilling rational and 
coalitional models of organization, Organization Science, 2(4), pp. 104-113. 
Barrios, S., Görg, H. & Strobl, E. (2005) Foreign direct investment, competition and industrial development in the 
host country, European Economic Review, 49(7), pp. 1761-1784. 
Barry, F., Goerg, H. & McDowell, A. (2003). Outward FDI and the Investment Development Path of a Late-
Industrializing Economy: Evidence from Ireland, Regional Studies, 37(4), pp. 341-349. 
Bartlett, C.A. & Ghoshal, G. (1989) Managing Across Borders: The Transnational Solution.(Boston,  Harvard 
Business School Press). 
Bell, M. & Marin, A (2004) Where do FDI-related technology spillovers come from in emerging economies? An 
exploration in Argentina in the 1990s, European Journal of Development Research, 16, pp. 653-686. 
Bellak, C. (2001) The Austrian Investment Development Path, Transnational Corporations, 10(2), pp. 68-107.  
Benito, G., Grogaard, B., & Narula, R. (2003) Environmental influences on MNE subsidiary roles: Economic 
integration and the Nordic countries’, Journal of International Business Studies, 34, pp. 443-456. 
Benito, G. & Narula, R. (2008) Multinationals on the Periphery (London, Palgrave Macmillan). 
Birkinshaw, J & Hood, N. (1998) Multinational subsidiary evolution: Capability and charter change in foreign-
owned subsidiary companies, Academy of Management Review, 23(4), pp. 773-795. 
Birkinshaw, J. (1996) How multinational subsidiary mandates are gained and lost? Journal of International 
Business Studies, 27(3), pp. 467-495. 
Birkinshaw, J. (2002) Managing internal R&D networks in global firms, Long Range Planning, 35, pp,  245-267. 
Birkinshaw, J., & Hood, N. (2000) Characteristics of foreign subsidiaries in industry clusters, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 31(1), pp. 141-154. 
Bruton, H. (1998) A Reconsideration of Import Substitution, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, pp. 903-936. 
Cantwell, J., & Mudambi, R. (2000) The location of MNE R&D activity: the role of investment incentives, 
Management International Review, 40(1), pp. 127-148. 
Chang, H. (2004) Regulation of Foreign investment in historical perspective, European Journal of Development 
Research, 16, pp. 687 – 715. 
Chowdhury, A. & Mavrotas, G. (2006) FDI and growth: What causes what? World Economy, 29(1), pp. 9-19. 
34 
Criscuolo, P, Narula, R. & Verspagen, B. (2005) Measuring knowledge flows among European and American 
multinationals: a patent citation analysis, Economics of Innovation and New Technologies, 14, p. 417-433. 
Criscuolo, P. & Narula, R. (2008) A novel approach to national technological accumulation and absorptive capacity: 
Aggregating Cohen and Levinthal, The European Journal of Development Research, 20(1), pp. 56-73.  
Costa, I. & Filippov, S. (2008) Foreign-owned subsidiaries: a neglected nexus between foreign direct investment, 
industrial and innovation policies. Science and Public Policy, 35(6), pp 379-390. 
Dunning, J.H. & Lundan, S.M. (2008) Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. 2nd Edition, 
(Basingstoke, Edward Elgar). 
Dunning, J.H. & Narula, R. (1996) (eds), Foreign Direct Investment and Governments: Catalysts for Economic 
Restructuring (London, Routledge). 
Dunning, J.H. & Narula.R. (2004) Multinationals and Industrial Competitiveness: A New Agenda. (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar). 
Durán, J. & Úbeda, F. (2001) The investment development path: a new empirical approach, Transnational 
Corporations, 10 (2), pp. 1-34. 
Durán, J. & Úbeda, F. (2005) The investment development path of newly developed countries. International 
Journal of the Economics of Business, 12(1), pp. 123-137. 
Fagerberg, J. & Srholec, M. (2007) National innovation systems, capabilities and economic development, Research 
Policy, 37, pp. 1417-1435. 
Galan, J., Gonzalez-Benito, J. & Zuñiga-Vincente, J. (2007) Factors determining the location decisions of Spanish 
MNEs: an analysis based on the investment development path, Journal of International Business Studies 38, 
pp. 975-997. 
Giroud, A. (2003) Transnational Corporations, Technology and Economic Development: Backward Linkages 
and Knowledge Transfer in South East Asia (Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar). 
Giuliani, E, Pietrobelli, C & Rabellotti, R (2005) Upgrading in global value chains: Lessons from Latin American 
clusters, World Development, 33, pp. 549-573. 
Hansen, H & Rand, J (2006) On the causal links between FDI and growth in developing countries, World Economy, 
29(1), pp. 21-41. 
Haque, I. (2007) Rethinking industrial policy, G-24 Discussion paper Series, No 183, UNCTAD, Geneva 
Henderson, J, Dicken, P., Hess, M., Coe, N. & Yeung, H. (2002) Global production networks and the analysis of 
economic development, Review of International Political Economy, 9(3), pp. 436-464. 
Henisz, W., Zelner, B & Guillén, M. (2005) The worldwide diffusion of market-oriented infrastructure reform, 
1977-1999, American Sociological Review, 70, pp. 871-897. 
Iguchi, C. (2008) Determinants of backward linkages: The case of TNC subsidiaries in Malaysia, Asian Business & 
Management, 7, pp. 53–73. 
Javorcik, B. & Saggi, K. (2004) Technological asymmetry and the mode of foreign investment. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 3196. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
35 
Jindra, B., Giroud, A & Scott-Kennel, J (2009) Subsidiary Roles, Vertical Linkages and Economic Development: 
Lessons from Transition Economies, Journal of World Business, 44(2), pp. 167-179. 
Kaplinsky, R (2000) Spreading the gains from globalisation: What can be learned from value chain analysis? 
Journal of Development Studies, 37(2), pp. 117-146. 
Katz, J. (2001) Structural reforms and technological behaviour. The sources and nature of technological change in 
Latin America in the 1990s', Research Policy, 30, pp. 1-19. 
Lall, S. (1992) Technological capabilities and industrialization, World Development, 2(2), pp.165-86. 
Lall, S. (1996) Learning from the Asian Tigers (Macmillan: Basingstoke). 
Lall, S. & Narula, R. (2004) FDI and its Role in economic development: Do we need a new agenda, European 
Journal of Development Research, 16(3), pp. 447-464.  
Liang, G. (2004) New Competition: Foreign Direct Investment and Industrial Development in China, (Rotterdam, 
ERIM) 
List, F. (1844) The National System of Political Economy (London: Longmans, Green & Co., translated in 1885, 
reprinted by Fairfield: Augustus M. Kelley, 1977). 
Liu, X, Buck, T. & Shu, C (2005) Chinese economic development, the next stage: outward FDI? International 
Business Review, 14, pp. 97-115. 
Lorentzen, J. (2005) The absorptive capacities of South African automotive component suppliers, World 
Development, 33, pp. 1153-1182 . 
Marin, A. & Bell, M. (2006) Technology spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): the active role of MNC 
subsidiaries in Argentina in the 1990s, The Journal of Development Studies, 42(4), pp. 678-697. 
Martınez, J., & Jarillo, J. (1991) Coordination demands of international strategies, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 22(3), pp. 429-444. 
Mathews, J. (2006) Dragon multinationals: new players in 21st century globalization. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management,. 23, pp.139-141. 
Meyer K., Wright, M. & Pruthi, S. (2009) Managing knowledge in foreign entry strategies: a resource-based 
analysis, Strategic Management Journal, 30(5), pp. 557-574 
Meyer, K. & Peng, M. (2005) Probing theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: Transactions, resources, and 
institutions, Journal of International Business Studies 36, pp. 600-621. 
Mody, A. (2004) Is FDI Integrating the World Economy? The World Economy, 27(8), pp. 1195-1222. 
Morris, M & Barnes, J (2008) Staying alive in the global automotive industry: what can developing economies learn 
from South Africa about linking into global automotive value chains? European Journal of Development 
Research, 20, pp. 31-55 
Mytelka, L. & Barclay, L. (2006) Using foreign investment strategically for innovation, in Lall, S. and Narula 
R.[eds] Understanding FDI-Assisted Economic Development (London, Routledge). 
Narula, R. (1996) Multinational Investment and Economic Structure (London, Routledge). 
Narula, R. (2002) Innovation systems and ‘inertia’ in R&D location: Norwegian firms and the role of systemic lock-
in, Research Policy, 31, pp. 795–816 
36 
Narula, R (2003) Globalisation and Technology: Interdependence, Innovation Systems and Industrial Policy 
(Cambridge, Polity Press). 
Narula, R. & Dunning, J.H. (2000) Industrial Development, Globalization and Multinational Enterprises: New 
Realities for Developing Countries, Oxford Development Studies 28(2), pp. 141-167. 
Narula, R & Jormanainen, I (2008) When a good science base is not enough to create competitive industries: Lock-
in and inertia in Russian systems of innovation, MERIT-UNU Working Papers 2008-059 
Narula ,R. & Marin, A. (2005) Exploring the relationship between direct and indirect spillovers from FDI in 
Argentina, Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on 
Innovation and Technology. 
Neuber, A. (1993) Towards a political economy of transition in Eastern Europe, Journal of International 
Development, 5(5), pp. 511-530. 
Papanastassiou, M & Pearce, R. (2009) The Strategic Development of Multinationals: Subsidiaries and 
Innovation  (Basingstoke, Palgrave).  
Pearce, R. D. (1999) The evolution of technology in multinational enterprises: the roles of creative subsidiaries, 
International Business Review, 8(2), pp. 125-148. 
Potters, J & Sloof, R. (1996) Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 12, pp. 403-442. 
Rasiah, R. (2006) Explaining Malaysia's export expansion in palm oil and related products, in :Chandra V. (ed), The 
How and the Why of Technology Development in Developing Economies (Washington D.C., World Bank). 
Rasiah, R. (2008) Ownership, institutions and technological intensities: automotive and electronics component firms 
in East Asia, in: Arestis P. and Eatwell J. (eds) Issues in Finance and Industry: Essays in Honour of Ajit 
Singh (London, Palgrave Macmillan). 
Rodrik, D, Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and 
integration in economic development, Journal of Economic Growth, 9, pp. 131-165. 
Roth, K., & Kostova, T. (2004) Organizational coping with institutional upheaval in transition economies, Journal 
of World Business, 38, pp. 314-331. 
Spiller, P. (1990) Politicians, interest groups, and regulators: A multiple-principals agency theory of regulation or 
"Let Them Be Bribed", Journal of Law and Economics, 33, p. 65-101. 
Taggart, J. H. & Hood, N. (1999) Determinants of autonomy in multinational corporation subsidiaries. European 
Management Journal, 17(2), pp. 226–236. 
Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market (Princeton, Princeton University Press). 
Wang, C. & Yu, L. (2007) Do spillover benefits grow with rising foreign direct investment? An empirical 
examination of the case of China, Applied Economics, 39, pp. 397-405. 
Wilkins, M. (2001) The history of the multinational enterprise, in: A. Rugman and T. Brewer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Business, (Oxford, Oxford University Press) 
Witt, M. & Lewin, A. (2007) Outward foreign direct investment as escape response to home country institutional 
constraints, Journal of International Business Studies,  38(4), pp. 579-594. 
37 
Yeung, H. , Lui Weidong, & Dicken, P. (2006) Transnational corporations an network effects of a local manufacturing 
cluster in mobile telecommunications equipment in China, World Development, 34, pp. 520-540. 
Young, S. & Tavares, A. (2004) Centralization and autonomy: back to the future, International Business Review, 
13, pp. 215–237. 
Zhang, H. & Van Den Bulcke, D. (1996) China: rapid changes in the investment development path, in: Dunning, J. 
H. & Narula, R. (Ed.) Foreign Direct Investment and Governments (London and New York, Routledge). 
 
 
38 
Figure 1: The Investment Development Path
(N.B.: Not drawn to scale; for illustrative purposes only)
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TABLE 1 Stages of the IDP 
 Stage I 
Natural resource based 
Stage II 
Investment driven 
Stage III 
Innovation driven 
Stage IV and V 
Increasing knowledge and 
service intensity; knowledge 
economy 
Balance of 
inward and 
outward FDI 
Little IFDI and negligible OFDI; 
low intra-industry trade and 
investment 
Increasing IFDI and limited OFDI; 
low intra-industry investment, 
increasing intra-industry trade 
OFDI increasing faster than IFDI; 
increasing intra-industry trade and 
investment 
Substantial I and O;  O often exceeds 
I; substantial intra-industry trade and 
investment; balance between I and O 
fluctuates: around net zero or positive 
level of in/outward FDI 
Characteristics 
of inward 
MNE activity 
Little inward FDI initially. As L 
advantages improve, resource 
based motives, and market 
seeking later. 
 
Growing presence of market-
seeking FDI - attracts labour-
intensive manufacturing;  
Raising Inward FDI, market-
seeking and increasing efficiency-
seeking FDI in manufacturing , In 
activities supplying more 
sophisticated products for domestic 
market, or requiring more skilled 
labour 
Increasingly market-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking and asset-
augmenting investment 
Characteristics 
of outward 
MNE activity 
No outward FDI – strategic 
investments and capital flight. 
Little outward FDI. Mainly  
Resource- and market-seeking 
investment in other developing 
countries; some ‘escape’ 
investment to developed countries; 
mostly regional greenfield 
investment; natural resource 
investment; light manufacturing 
employing established 
technologies. 
Growing outward FDI; All kinds of 
investment including efficiency-
seeking and some asset augmenting 
investment; mass-produced 
differentiated consumer goods, e.g. 
electrical products, clothing; more 
service investment, e.g. 
construction, banking 
Increasingly efficiency-seeking and 
asset-augmenting investment; regional 
and global; more M&As and alliances; 
investment in knowledge-intensive 
sectors, e.g. ICT, biotechnology, and 
high value-added services, e.g. 
consultancy; restructuring of global 
value chains 
O advantages Few domestic firms with O-adv.  Ability to produce low-cost, 
standardised products, or those 
Strong domestic industries; Ability 
to differentiate products and/or 
Strong created-asset O-adv. of 
domestic firms; Substantial Oa + Ot; 
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 Stage I 
Natural resource based 
Stage II 
Investment driven 
Stage III 
Innovation driven 
Stage IV and V 
Increasing knowledge and 
service intensity; knowledge 
economy 
of firms   based on natural resources of home 
country 
 
adapt to local consumer tastes; 
some limited product and process 
innovation  
 
increasing importance of Oi; 
coordination of the internal and 
external network of the MNE; 
importance of open innovation 
Industrial 
upgrading & 
manufacturing 
comparative 
adv. evolution 
     Hecksher-Ohlin sectors 
                                                     Undifferentiated Smithian sectors 
                                                                                      Differentiated Smithian sectors 
                                                                                                                      Innovation-intensive Schumpeterian sectors 
L advantages 
of the home 
country  
Few L advantages.  Mainly 
presence of natural resources, 
but infrastructural support also 
important; government role in 
setting up legal and commercial 
system.  
 
Growing L-adv., Low real wage 
costs; natural resources; Supply 
capacity and clusters of local 
industry; growing importance of 
education, transport and ICT 
infrastructure;  
 
Created-asset L-adv. are increasing;  
Entrepreneurship; larger, more 
sophisticated, markets; government 
role in economic restructuring and 
enforcing competitive markets; 
increasing importance of informal 
institutions 
 
Strong created-asset L-adv.,Increasing 
importance of supply capabilities, 
support services and market-
facilitating services; government role 
in minimising transaction costs, 
supporting innovation, and fostering 
economic restructuring; increasing 
importance of informal institutions 
Economic 
structure 
PRIMARY Sectors  
                                                    Declining  
                                                                                                                         MANUFACTURING sectors   
                                                                               Increasing                                                                                                                      Declining 
                                                                                                                       SERVICE sectors  
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 Stage I 
Natural resource based 
Stage II 
Investment driven 
Stage III 
Innovation driven 
Stage IV and V 
Increasing knowledge and 
service intensity; knowledge 
economy 
                                                                                                                                                                     Increasing 
Preferred 
modality of IB 
activity 
Imperfect markets and peripheral 
nature imply either trade or FDI 
linkages. 
Tendency for firms to prefer more 
equity ownership to protect 
proprietary knowledge and to 
control markets, and more licensing 
activity 
Increasing use of cooperative and/or contractual relationships to manage the 
external network of the MNE; focus on ‘core competence’ with extensive use 
of outsourcing 
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Type of FDI 
 
In the 1970s In the 2000s. 
A.  Resource seeking  
1. Availability, price and quality of natural 
resources. 
2. Infrastructure to enable resources to be 
exploited, and products arising from them 
to be exported. 
3.  Government restrictions on FDI and/or 
on capital and dividend remissions. 
4.  Investment incentives, e.g. tax holidays. 
 
 
1. As in the 1970s, but local opportunities for 
upgrading quality of resources and the 
processing and transportation of their output is a 
more important locational incentive. 
2.  Availability of local partners to jointly promote 
knowledge and/or capital-intensive resource 
exploitation. 
3.  Entrepreneurship, trustworthiness and honesty  
of local partners. 
4. Extent and quality of national or regional 
enforcement mechanisms. 
B. Market Seeking 1. Mainly domestic, and occasionally (e.g. 
in Europe) adjacent regional 
 markets. 
2. Real wage costs; material costs. 
3.  Transport costs; tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers. 
4. As A3 above, but also (where relevant) 
privileged access to import licenses. 
1. Mostly large and growing domestic markets, and 
adjacent regional markets (e.g. NAFTA, EU, 
etc.). 
2. Availability and price of skilled and professional 
labour. 
3. Presence and competitiveness of related firms, 
e.g. leading industrial suppliers. 
4.  Quality of national and local infrastructure, and 
institutional competence. 
5. Less spatially related market distortions, but 
increased role of agglomerative spatial 
economies and local service support facilities. 
6. Macroeconomic and macro-organizational 
policies as pursued by host governments. 
7. Quality of local norms and standards, and social 
capital. 
8. Growing importance of promotional activities by 
regional or local development agencies. 
C. Efficiency Seeking 1. Mainly production cost related (e.g. 
labour, materials, machinery, etc.). 
2. Freedom to engage in trade in 
intermediate and final products. 
3. Presence of agglomerative economies, 
e.g. export processing zones. 
4. Investment incentives e.g., tax breaks, 
accelerated depreciation, grants, 
subsidized land. 
1 .As in the 1970s, but more emphasis placed on 
B2,3,4,5, and 7 above, especially for knowledge-
intensive and integrated MNE activities, e.g. R 
& D and some office functions. 
2 Increased role of governments in removing 
obstacles to restructuring economic activity, and 
facilitating the upgrading of human resources by 
appropriate educational and training programs. 
3. Availability of specialized spatial clusters, e.g., 
science and industrial parks, service support 
systems, etc:  and of specialized factor inputs.  
Opportunities for new initiatives by investing 
firms; an entrepreneurial environment, and one 
which encourages competitiveness enhancing 
cooperation within and between firms. 
4.  Ability of locations to offer trust-intensive, 
covenantal relations of an inter-personal, inter-
firm and firm/government kind. 
D. Strategic Asset 
Seeking 
1. Availability of knowledge-related assets 
and markets necessary to protect or 
enhance O specific advantages of 
investing firms – and at the right price. 
2. Institutional and other variables 
influencing ease or difficulty at which 
such assets can be acquired by foreign 
firms. 
1. As in the 1970s, but growing geographical 
dispersion of knowledge-based assets, and need 
of firms to harness such assets from foreign 
locations, makes this a more important motive 
for FDI. 
2. The price and availability of “synergistic” assets 
to foreign investors. 
3.  Opportunities offered (often by particular sub-
national spatial units) for exchange of localized 
tacit knowledge, ideas and interactive learning. 
4.  Access to different cultures, institutions and 
value systems; and different consumer demands 
and preferences. 
5.  Ability to form productive relationships with 
acquired firms. 
Table 2 How MNE motives have evolved over thirty years. 
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Figure 2: equity and non-equity cross border knowledge flows 
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